Create a free account to read this article
or signup to continue reading
Beijing: A cornerstone of the Obama administration's foreign policy, the United States' strategic 'pivot' to Asia has long been seen by Beijing as a cynical ploy to counter its rise. This week Barack Obama made history by announcing the lifting of a decades-old US arms embargo on Vietnam, its former Cold War enemy, a move sure to raise eyebrows in China. Entering the final months of his presidency, Obama is in Vietnam and Japan to underscore Washington's commitment to the region, putting potential flashpoints in Sino-American relations squarely back in focus. So what are the areas of US-China disagreement?
South China Sea
The US sees China's aggressive programme of land reclamation and construction on islands and reefs in the disputed South China Sea as a potential threat to freedom of navigation along the critical global trade route.
Beijing has in turn labelled regular US Navy "freedom of navigation" operations as provocative and has also been angered by attempts by the Obama administration to unify support among the 10-member Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) against Beijing on this issue. Greater military cooperation with the likes of Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam – Mr Obama announced the lift of an arms trade embargo in Hanoi on Monday – are all seen as part of a strategy to contain China's strategic rise.
The Philippines has lodged its protests with the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague, but China has consistently said the case is an abuse of international law and that it would ignore any ruling, which is expected next month.
China's President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama at the White House in Washington, DC in September. Photo: Andrew Harrer
Trade
Vietnam and Malaysia are among the biggest beneficiaries of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade pact with the United States, Australia and other Pacific Rim economies, which doesn't include China.
China instead has looked to bypass the TPP with wide-ranging regional deals of its own, including the South-East Asia focused Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Xi Jinping's signature One Belt One Road initiative, and the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank, which the US and Japan unsuccessfully lobbied regional allies not to partake in.
Cybersecurity
Chinese officials have relished referencing the Edward Snowden revelations in bunting back accusations that Beijing is sanctioning cyber attacks and hacking of key US institutions.
But Washington insists it spies on other countries for national security reasons, while Chinese hackers target key US businesses for corporate espionage and intellectual property theft. The US has recently passed legislation allowing US businesses to more easily bring federal suits against those who steal trade information. It has also indicted members of China's military wanted for hacking of US information.
The jury is still out as to whether a landmark agreement in September to jointly fight cybercrime has made any inroads.
Ling Wancheng
China has been pushing for the extradition of Ling Wancheng, the younger brother of Ling Jihua, a disgraced former top aide to former Chinese president Hu Jintao who has been charged with corruption.
The US has remained tight-lipped over the younger Ling, who has been reported to hold state secrets ranging from military intelligence to personal information on China's leaders. Ling's lawyers, for their part, have denied the claims and say their client, an avid golfer, was merely in the US to "share golf secrets".
Chinese President Xi Jinping, centre right, at the signing ceremony for the Articles of Agreement of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Photo: AP
New type of 'Great Power Relations'
The Xi administration has been at great pains for the US to refer to relations between the two superpowers by Beijing's preferred nomenclature: the "new type of great power relations".
Washington has been steadfast in its reluctance to characterise relations in those terms, concerned the recognition of strength and power parity would also imply recognition of China's core interests, including its territorial ambitions.
The prevailing view in the Pentagon, too, is that while China is happy to talk in terms of shared power for now, Beijing's ultimate goal is to supplant the US as the solitary regional hegemon, eventually rendering shared "great power relations" obsolete.
